Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrived in Washington on November 7 with an unusually large entourage of ministers, media allies and business elites for his first bilateral meeting with President Donald Trump since Trump returned to office. The visit—historic in scale and timing—was designed as a political spectacle.
For months, Trump had pressured Orbán to support U.S. sanctions on Russian fossil fuels and to replace Russian supplies with American LNG. This posed a major dilemma for Orbán, who has cast himself as Trump’s closest European ally while maintaining warm relations with both Washington and Moscow. At first, Orbán appeared to gain from Trump’s early bid to end the war in Ukraine through concessions to Russia. But as the traditional foreign-policy establishment regained influence in Washington, U.S. policy hardened, culminating in new sanctions and deeper military cooperation that left Budapest increasingly cornered.
As a result, the central question in Hungarian policy circles became: How long can Orbán delay compliance with Russian energy sanctions?
A Pyrrhic Victory
The deal announced after the meeting remains ambiguous. Orbán portrayed it as an open-ended exemption from U.S. sanctions on Russian energy. But U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio contradicted him, saying the waiver would last only one year. American officials also suggested the agreement is still informal and not yet codified. Even so, Hungary appears to have bought itself time—at least beyond the April elections. Trump further reinforced Orbán’s narrative that Hungary cannot quickly unwind its dependence on Russian oil, and the two leaders even revived discussion of a potential Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest.
Despite the uncertainties, the waiver is a political win for Orbán: it showcases his ties to Washington, reinforces his image as a global power player, and ensures continued profits for Hungarian energy giant MOL.
But it comes at a steep price. In Washington, Orbán committed to buying American nuclear fuel, U.S. military hardware and U.S. LNG—all significant reversals of long-standing Hungarian energy policy. These concessions underscore his ongoing strategy of trading policy alignment for external support rather than building genuine domestic capacity.
The deeper costs fall into three categories: moral and political, economic, and structural.
Moral and Political Costs
The U.S. decision to allow Hungary to continue importing Russian oil carries heavy ethical and political implications. Orbán has long cultivated close ties with Vladimir Putin, but doing so has had an increasingly high domestic and international cost.
Hungary and Slovakia are now the only EU states still purchasing Russian oil. Hungary even increased its Russian imports after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine—up to 86 percent by 2024—allowing it to keep retail energy prices low, a cornerstone of Orbán’s political strategy.
To sustain this, Orbán has spent years persuading parts of his electorate that Putin is a protector of cheap energy and conservative Christian values against a supposedly declining liberal West. Yet most Hungarians remain pro-EU, and Orbán’s perceived alignment with Moscow is politically risky. His stance has alienated even his illiberal counterparts in countries like Poland and Italy. Hungary’s November 14 declaration that it will oppose the EU’s planned 2027 Russian energy phase-out only deepens its political isolation.
The Exhaustion of “Orbánomics”
The economic cost is equally significant. Hungary’s dependence on Russian oil mirrors its broader vulnerability: despite its nationalist rhetoric, the country remains deeply reliant on foreign investment and EU funds.
During the 2010s, Orbán could play both sides—benefiting from EU money while cultivating illiberal alliances. But corruption, democratic backsliding and Budapest’s pro-Russian foreign policy have hardened EU attitudes. Orbánomics—his attempt to build an illiberal economic model—has failed to generate meaningful industrial upgrading or higher wages. Hungary still depends on low-cost manufacturing for foreign firms, and Orbán’s “Eastern Opening” strategy did not deliver replacement markets or capital from Russia or China.
The one-year U.S. waiver may ease short-term energy pressure, but it reinforces the structural weaknesses of an externally dependent, low-wage, shock-prone economy.
The Architecture of Illiberal Power
Orbán’s ability to leverage connections in Washington is not accidental. Since 2010, he has pursued a systematic project to dismantle liberal institutional dominance and build an international illiberal ecosystem. Hungary became a hub for networking with U.S. national conservatives, with millions of taxpayer dollars funneled into think tanks, media outlets and cultural initiatives designed to bind Orbánism and Trumpism together.
In this ecosystem, Hungary serves as a model—an illiberal “laboratory” cited by Trump-aligned intellectuals to justify assaults on media, academia and democratic institutions. Orbán has described Hungary as a “unique island in an ocean of liberalism,” and Trump’s circle embraces this role.
But the costs are substantial. Maintaining this transnational illiberal infrastructure requires continuous financial support, political alignment and strategic concessions—each binding Hungary more tightly to Trump’s shifting demands.
Can Illiberalism Be Saved?
Ultimately, the Trump-Orbán deal offers temporary relief without addressing Hungary’s deep political and economic vulnerabilities. For Orbán, it is a crucial short-term win that may influence the April election by preventing a pre-election energy crisis. The reprieve gives him room to deploy familiar pre-election tactics and preserve support.
To stay in power, Orbán must reframe the election around his international illiberal alliances rather than Hungary’s economic decline. This is difficult in a politically closed and tightly controlled media environment—but not impossible. A symbolic gesture, such as a Trump visit to Budapest or even a staged “peace summit” involving Putin, could provide the domestic political boost Orbán needs.
But none of this changes the underlying reality: the victory in Washington was costly, fragile and rooted in Hungary’s growing dependence on external powers—leaving the nation more vulnerable than ever.
